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add a whit" to the justification of my belief that it is a whale; what the realization 
does is simply to help give me knowledge that my belief is justified (170). But 
that seems to give perceptual awareness the wrong role. 
Part III, "Completing the Causal Theory", offers novel answers to two tradi- 
tional puzzles for causal theories: what distinguishes deviant from non-deviant 
ways in which objects may cause visual experiences?; and what distinguishes the 
stage of a causal chain that is the thing seen from all the other stages that are 
causally necessary for S's experience but are not seen? On the first puzzle, Vision 
proposes a new form of counterfactual condition for non-deviance (ch. 7). On the 
second puzzle, his proposal is this: the object S sees is the only cause of S's 
experience for which it is a conceptual truth that changes in the visually 
detectable properties of the cause would be tracked by changes in the character of 
S's experience. The weight here is on "conceptual truth". Thus, it is true that 
changes in the properties of S's retinas, say, would systematically affect the char- 
acter of S's experience: but that is an empirical truth; and the fact that it is a 
merely empirical truth distinguishes S's retinas, which are an unseen cause of S's 
experience, from that cause of S's experience which is seen. This proposal strikes 
me as strangely indirect. The worry is not that the proposal is open to counter- 
example. The question, rather, is whether, when all the details are in, Vision's 
view will be an improvement on simpler views (Strawson's, for example) that 
appeal directly to facts about how things look to the subject. Such views work by 
developing the common-sense truth that, although my retinas are causally neces- 
sary for the experience I have when I see a whale, it does not look to me, when I 
have that experience, as though my retinas are thus-and-so. In the spirit of what 
he says in Part II, Vision might object that seeing does not require the kind of 
match between the actual nature of the thing I see and the character of my experi- 
ence that would be needed to make this proposal work. But it is not clear to me 
that the Strawsonian proposal needs anything more than Vision's own idea of an 
experience's matching "visually detectable properties" of what is seen (231). 
The book has many merits. It provides an extremely thorough and comprehen- 
sive coverage of its subject matter. Vision follows the argument wherever it goes, 
is painstaking in considering the views to which he objects, and bends over 
backwards to do justice to arguments in their favour. He displays a great deal of 
common sense and good judgement. On the other hand, his book is not always 
easy to read. It is long-some 150,000 words, by my reckoning. Some parts of 
the argument are dense and rather indirect; a lot is demanded of the reader. But Vi- 
sions's own views are frequently appealing and are always worth thinking about. 
And his criticism of others' views seems to me often to get things exactly right. 
WILLIAM CHILD 
University College, Oxford 
Partisan or Neutral? The Futility of Public Political Theory. 
MICHAEL J. WHITE. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997. Pp. xiii, 193. 
The political philosophy of recent American liberalism has been designed to 
answer three questions: how to justify egalitarian principles of distributive justice 
that should be compelling to any rational individual; how to defend a view of 
government according to which it is required to be neutral between rival concep- 
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tions of the human good, while guaranteeing the liberties of the adherents of each 
to pursue the achievement of their good, as they understand it; and how to elabo- 
rate an idea of public reason that restricts the kinds of argument that are permissi- 
ble within the political sphere to those that appeal to principles shared by all 
reasonable citizens, so excluding appeal to comprehensive religious or philo- 
sophical doctrines of the human good. John Rawls has of course made the single 
most important contribution to answering these questions and it is therefore 
unsurprising that Michael J. White's book, which aims to undermine each of these 
projects, is a notable addition to the body of philosophical writing devoted to 
Rawls' work. Yet it is a good deal more than this. 
Part of the interest of White's book derives from his insightful and incisive 
criticisms of other philosophical positions. But its unusual importance is more a 
matter of his own central theses. White's argument begins from the historical 
facts about the origins of liberal regimes and the sociological facts about liberal 
politics in the contemporary United States. Liberalism after all has its roots in a 
postReformation modus vivendi, a set of ad hoc arrangements for the coexistence 
of what had been destructively warring points of view, arrangements shaped by 
the contingencies of the outcomes of their struggles. And liberal democratic 
institutions and procedures nowadays both embody and provide a means for arriv- 
ing at piecemeal and provisional compromises between contending standpoints, 
compromises that secure consensus or at least acquiescence from the citizenry. 
The pragmatic political justifications for such makeshift arrangements have 
never seemed adequate to liberal theorists, who have therefore tried to provide a 
set of rationally justifiable principles, not only as a theoretical underpinning for 
liberalism, but also as standards by appeal to which institutions and procedures 
might be criticized and reformed. It is White's contention that, in offering princi- 
ples and philosophical arguments as a basis for political agreement that would be 
superior to the negotiated and patchwork compromises of actual political life, 
such theorists have typically moved from the less to the more controversial, 
appealing in their arguments to considerations that are less likely to secure 
consensus and stability than are the pragmatically arrived at arrangements that the 
theorists' principles are designed to justify or to criticize. This objection to 
liberal theorizing is reinforced by another. 
Liberals need theoretically justifiable principles. They cannot rest content 
with the contingent outcomes of political conflict, even in societies with 
democratic institutions. Some outcomes are and must be shown by appeal to 
principles to be, from a liberal point of view, superior to others. But the only sets 
of principles that can provide for liberalism what it requires are perfectionist, 
embodying some comprehensive conception of the good, determining "which 
among various human desires, goals, and commitments are worthy of political 
protection and support, and which are not" (p. 178). Government in accordance 
with such principles cannot be neutral, but will be partisan in the most fundamen- 
tal controversies. "And it is reasonable to suppose that the better it is at justify- 
ing a particular liberal political agenda, the more perfectionist and controversial 
it will be" (p. 178). But liberalism, as those theorists whom White takes to be the 
exemplars of contemporary liberalism understand it, is committed to the rejection 
of perfectionism. So liberalism confronts a dilemma to which it has no adequate 
response. 
The contrast between liberal political attitudes and those recommended by 
White emerges most clearly in his discussion of toleration and civility. It is on a 
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liberal view principles of justice that mandate public toleration, within prescribed 
limits, of advocacy of conceptions of the good, behavior and speech that we may 
abhor as private individuals. And White quotes Rawls as asserting that it is a 
moral duty of civility to be able to explain to one another how principles and 
policies that we advocate "can be supported by the political values of public 
reason" (p. 113; Rawls 1993 p. 217). Principles of justice and duty, that is to say, 
enjoin toleration of and civility towards those who advocate measures of which as 
private individuals we disapprove. 
Against this White argues that we have no good reason to tolerate what we 
judge to be bad, except when prudence so dictates. What prudence dictates depends 
upon the political and social context, but it is often the case that attempts to 
suppress the advocacy of evils will have worse consequences than those of tolera- 
tion. And this will generally be so in a religiously and morally pluralist society. 
Intolerance and incivility will prevent the "amity requisite for the effective pursuit 
of other aspects of the common good" (p. 116) and will foster a range of evils. So 
there are strong prudential, consequentialist grounds for upholding the First 
Amendment. 
Rawlsian and other liberalisms are not the only doctrines whose advocates 
claim that they deserve the allegiance of all reasonable individuals, whatever their 
other fundamental commitments. On White's view, the proponents of all such 
doctrines will be apt to find themselves confronting the same type of dilemma that 
liberals confront. He considers the case of what he calls the neonatural law 
theorists, Germaine Grisez, John Finnis and Robert P. George, who have argued 
that there are a set of basic human goods, whose inviolability must be acknowl- 
edged by any reasonable individual. These theorists have attempted to present the 
precepts that enjoin respect for those goods as independent of metaphysical and 
theological foundations and presuppositions, so distinguishing their view from 
traditional presentations of natural law theory. White contends that in so doing 
they are in some ways close to postEnlightenment liberalism. For, although their 
doctrines of toleration and of religious neutrality on the part of government are 
significantly different from those advanced by liberals, they too appeal to what 
they take to be principles compelling to all reasonable individuals in order to 
identify the scope and limits of toleration, upholding, as White notes, a view of 
liberty of conscience "that is virtually identical to the liberal conception" (p. 
145). White's response is similar to his response to liberal theory. By depriving 
what they take to be the precepts of the natural law of that content which those 
precepts derived from their metaphysical and theological presuppositions, the 
neonatural law theorists have made those precepts open to too many interpreta- 
tions for them to function as a basis for a rationally grounded consensus. 
Indeed in contemporary democracies not only does consensus not derive from 
justificatory theory, but something less than consensus is generally needed for a 
viable politics. White follows Nicholas Rescher in holding that what is generally 
needed for stability and legitimacy is no more than acquiescence "rooted not in 
agreement with others but rather in a preparedness to get on without it" (p. 107; 
Rescher 1993 p. 166), in a refusal to quarrel with the imperfect compromises of 
the democratic process. 
White has made an excellent case that badly needs answering. It invites at least 
two critical responses. One is that White has been too quick in dismissing the 
claims of a perfectionist liberalism. He quotes Joseph Raz on toleration with 
approval, but he never examines Raz's version of liberal theory with its rejection 
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of neutrality in favor of a certain kind of perfectionist pluralism. And White's own 
arguments warrant only the conclusion that it may be difficult to combine liberal- 
ism and perfectionism successfully, not that it is impossible. So here White needs 
to say more, and especially more about Raz's arguments, if he is to convince us. 
Another critical response puts White's own position to the question. Granted 
that everyday American political life is for the most part a matter of negotiated 
and patchwork compromises, it is surely the case that there are better and worse 
compromises and, more importantly, wholly unacceptable compromises. These 
may be less rare than White seems to suppose. Consider the vast extent to which 
in the contemporary United States differences in access to effective public 
decision-making and to the resources of the legal system are determined by 
money. The outcome is that compromise is generally in the interests of the rich 
and acquiescence in compromise is imposed by powerlessness. Is such com- 
promise acceptable? Does such acquiescence legitimate? And do we not have 
urgent need of theoretically grounded principles to answer these questions? 
REFERENCES 
Rawls, John: 1993, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press). 




Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert. FRED FELDMAN. Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 220. 
This is a collection of ten of Fred Feldman's previously published articles along 
with an introduction. The essays concern three main topics: the nature and struc- 
ture of consequentialism, the nature of pleasure, and the moral relevance of desert. 
The introduction provides a very useful overview of how the pieces fit together and 
of their general significance. In addition, each article is preceded by a very crisp 
synopsis. 
In 1973 Hector Castafteda raised questions about how the notion of alternative 
actions should be understood in act consequentialist theory. Suppose that a heart 
surgeon has the choice about whether to perform heart surgery on a patient, and 
that performing the surgery has much better consequences. It would seem that act 
consequentialism should hold that the surgeon has an obligation to perform the 
surgery. But this act involves cracking the patient's ribs, which would seem to 
have worse consequences than not cracking the ribs. Hence cracking the ribs 
seems to be morally forbidden. But then the surgeon has a moral obligation to 
perform the surgery, which empirically requires cracking the ribs, which is forbid- 
den. There's a problem somewhere! 
Feldman's solution, developed in "World Utilitarianism" (and in his book 
Doing the Best We Can), is to reject the appeals to the notions of alternative 
actions and to the consequences of actions, and to focus instead on the notion of 
alternative life histories. A life history for a given person is complete 
specification of the actions he/she performs from birth to death. At a given time 
of a given world for a given person some life histories are within the agent's 
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